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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Donald and Rosemarie Merino appeal the ruling of the 
United States Tax Court sustaining the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue's imposition of additional taxes for their 
negligent underpayment of tax pursuant to IRC SS 6653(a) 
and (a)(1), and for underpayment of tax attributable to a 
valuation overstatement pursuant to IRC S 6659.1 The 
Commissioner's decision was based upon the taxpayers' 
attempt to claim tax credits and losses purportedly 
resulting from their 1981 investment in Northeast Resource 
Recovery Associates ("Northeast") a tax shelter that was a 
limited partnership involved in the plastics recycling 
business. Northeast is almost identical to the plastics 
recycling shelter described in Provizer v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2531 (1992), aff'd 
without pub. op., 996 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1163 (1994). In Provizer, the Tax Court 
upheld the Commissioner's imposition of additional tax and 
penalties because the tax shelter at issue was a"sham" 
lacking economic substance and business purpose. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The IRC sections at issue here, IRC S 6653 and 6659, were repealed 
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 1001- 
239, 103 Stat. 2106, S 7721(c)(2), effective for returns due after 1989. 
However, negligence and substantial valuation misstatements are both 
components of the accuracy-related penalty found in IRC S 6662. See 
IRC SS 6662(b)(1), (b)(3) and (e). 
 
                                2 
  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the Tax Court's 
ruling here. 
 
I. 
 
Donald Merino is one of many investors who invested in 
a tax shelter involving the leasing of Sentinel Recyclers and 
"Plastics Recycling Programs." These programs promoted 
expanded polyethylene ("EPE") recyclers during 1981 and 
expanded polystyrene ("EPS") recyclers during 1982. Merino 
is a professional engineer with a Ph.D. in managerial 
economics and has spent his entire working life in various 
capacities of the petrochemical industry. He claims that he 
is an "acknowledged expert in hydro-carbon and plastics 
technology." Appellants' Br. at 16.2  He learned of Northeast 
through a CPA friend who was considering recommending 
the tax shelter to clients and who asked Merino to examine 
it. At the time of the request, Merino's job involved 
forecasting the price of oil and petroleum-based products 
such as plastics, and he was actively involved in predicting 
market trends in the petroleum industry. As a result of the 
investigation that Merino undertook for his friend, Merino 
subsequently invested in Northeast himself. 
 
Northeast was created by several simultaneous 
transactions involving Packaging Industries, Inc. ("PI"), a 
company that manufactured and sold seven Sentinel EPE 
recyclers to ECI Corp. for $981,000 each.3  ECI then resold 
the EPE recyclers to F & G Group for $1,162,666. The 
$1,162,666 purchase price consisted of cash in the amount 
of $79,371.00 and a note in the amount of $1,083,294.00. 
Ninety percent of the note was nonrecourse, and the 
remaining ten percent recourse portion was due only after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Ironically, Merino appeared as an expert witness for the taxpayers in 
Provizer v. Commissioner. 
 
3. The Tax Court described the Sentinel EPE recycler as "a simple batch 
type machine designed to grind expanded polyethylene foam and film 
into a densified form called `popcorn' that could be further processed to 
produce resin pellets suitable for some uses in the plastics industry. 
[It] 
was incapable of recycling low density polyethylene by itself and had to 
be used in connection with grinders, extruders and pelletizers." Merino v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-385, slip op. at 8 (Aug. 21,1997). 
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the nonrecourse portion was paid. F & G Group then leased 
the recyclers to Northeast for 12 years (a lease term equal 
to 150% of the class life of the assets), for monthly rental 
payments of $110,000. Northeast, in turn, licensed the 
recyclers to FMEC Corp. for 12 years at a guaranteed 
minimum royalty of $110,000 per month. Northeast was 
also to receive additional royalties based on profits realized 
by FMEC or a sublicensee.4 Then, FMEC sublicensed the 
recyclers back to PI. 
 
All of the monthly payments required by and among the 
various entities offset each other. The payments consisted 
solely of offsetting bookkeeping entries, and no money ever 
changed hands. PI sublicensed the recyclers to end-users 
that would actually use them to recycle plastic scrap. The 
sublicense agreements provided that the end-users would 
transfer to PI 100% of the recycled scrap in exchange for a 
payment from FMEC based on the quality and quantity of 
recycled scrap. In reality, however, the terms of these 
sublicenses were regularly ignored. 
 
The purchase price of $1,162,666 per recycler that F & G 
"paid" ECI, and for which Northeast "leased" each recycler 
from F & G, was used as the basis for each recycler in 
computing a Northeast investor's investment and energy tax 
credits. However, the EPE recyclers had a manufacturing 
cost of only $18,000 each and the fair market value of each 
EPE recycler did not exceed $50,000 in 1981. Northeast's 
prospectus informed potential investors of the terms of the 
simultaneous transactions and stated that each investor 
would be entitled to claim income tax credits of $84,813 
and tax deductions of $40,174 for every $50,000 invested. 
The prospectus also advised investors of the high degree of 
business and tax risk associated with an investment in a 
tax shelter and warned that only people who could afford to 
lose all of their cash investment and anticipated tax 
benefits should invest. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. No profit was involved with the guaranteed minimum royalty. The 
prospectus stated that only additional royalties would produce a profit, 
and Northeast was entitled to additional royalties only if FMEC, or a 
sublicensee made a profit. 
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The prospectus further warned that Northeast had no 
operating history, that there was no established market for 
the recyclers, and that there were no assurances that the 
market prices for virgin resin would remain at their current 
level or that the recycled plastic would even be marketable 
as virgin resin. The prospectus informed investors that the 
general partner who was solely responsible for the 
management and operation of the business had no 
significant experience in marketing recycled products and 
that he had other business commitments requiring a 
substantial portion of his time. It also advised of the 
possibility of significant competition from current 
manufacturers of recycling equipment and of PI's (the 
recycler's manufacturer) decision not to apply for a patent 
to protect its trade secrets. 
 
Although the prospectus contained a copy of a favorable 
tax opinion by an attorney, it warned that investors should 
rely on their own advisors rather than the tax opinion 
letter. The opinions of two evaluators, both of whom owned 
interests in partnerships that leased EPE recyclers, were 
also contained in the prospectus. One of these evaluators 
concluded that the price that F & G was to pay for the 
recyclers was fair and reasonable, although the evaluator 
did not state the price, and he appeared to be unaware of 
it. The other evaluator did not appraise the recyclers and 
only concluded that they would be operational. 
 
II. 
 
When Merino undertook his investigation he obtained a 
copy of Northeast's prospectus from Northeast's general 
partner and spent two hours reading it. The general partner 
suggested that Merino visit PI's Massachusetts plant. 
Merino did so, but he had to sign a secrecy agreement 
before PI personnel would allow him to see the operation. 
Moreover, PI personnel still refused to show Merino PI's 
records even after he signed the agreement. 
 
While at the plant, Merino watched the operation and 
talked to PI's president, who told Merino that PI received 
bulk deliveries by truck instead of by train, and that this 
resulted in a penalty of four cents per pound. PI's president 
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also told Merino that the plant was in a location which was 
difficult for trucks to access, especially in the summer. The 
difficult access resulted in a "location differential" which 
Merino estimated to be several cents per pound. Merino 
also learned that PI was not the sole supplier of recycled 
plastic to any of its customers. In fact, most of PI's 
customers had between three and five suppliers. 
 
After his inquiry into Northeast, Merino decided to invest 
$24,000 of his own money through his CPA friend who 
acted as his nominee. As a result, Merino indirectly owned 
a 2.5% interest in the partnership. No one, including 
Merino, ever made a profit in any year from an investment 
in Northeast. 
 
III. 
 
F & G leased the recyclers to Northeast, and elected to 
pass the investment and energy tax credits through to 
Northeast. Consequently, on their 1981 tax return, the 
Merinos claimed their proportionate share of Northeast's 
tax credits and losses in the amounts of $22,431 and 
$19,526 respectively. The credits were based on a claimed 
value of $1,162,666 per recycler. The Merinos' 1981 income 
was $109,634, but the tax benefits from Northeast 
eliminated their 1981 income tax liability in its entirety. 
Moreover, since the Merinos did not completely use all of 
the tax credits on their 1981 return, they claimed credit 
carrybacks to 1978, 1979 and 1980, thereby reducing their 
tax liabilities for those years. 
 
The Commissioner ruled that Northeast lacked economic 
substance and business purpose, disallowed the claimed 
tax benefits, and assessed deficiencies in the Merinos' 
federal income taxes based upon the Commissioner's 
conclusion that the limited partnership was nothing more 
than a tax scheme. The deficiencies for the years in 
question aggregated to $50,000. In addition, the 
Commissioner determined that interest on the deficiencies 
after December 31, 1984, would be calculated at 120 
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percent of the statutory rate under IRC S 6621(c) because 
the underpayments were tax motivated transactions.5 
 
The taxpayers responded by filing a petition in Tax Court 
challenging the Commissioner's determination of deficiency. 
Thereafter, the Commissioner filed an amended answer in 
which he asserted additions to the tax for 1978, 1979, and 
1980 in the respective amounts of $25, $632 and $239 
under IRC S 6653(a) because the underpayment of tax was 
due to taxpayer's negligence; $1,582 for 1981 under IRC 
S 6653(a)(1) and 50 percent of the interest due on $31,645 
under IRC S 6653(a)(2). The Commissioner also asserted an 
additional tax for 1981 in the amount of $6,645 for a 
valuation overstatement under IRC S 6659. 
 
Prior to trial, the taxpayers stipulated that the limited 
partnership transaction lacked economic substance and 
that they would not therefore, be entitled to any 
deductions, losses, credits or any other tax benefits. They 
further stipulated that the underpayments made in their 
tax return were attributable to tax motivated transactions 
and that they were therefore subject to the increased 
interest rates under IRC S 6621(c). Finally, the taxpayers 
also stipulated that they did not intend to contest that the 
recycler had a fair market value that was less than $50,000 
in 1981 and 1982 and that there was, therefore, a 
valuation overstatement.6 Accordingly, the only issue at 
trial was the propriety of the Commissioner's imposition of 
the penalties7 for negligence and valuation overstatement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Commissioner's deficiency notice refers to IRC S 6621(d). However, 
this section was redesignated as S 6621(c) byS 1511(c)(1)(A) of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2744, which was 
later repealed by S 7721(c) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1989, Pub.L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2400. The repeal does not affect this 
case. 
 
6. Stipulations pursuant to Tax Court Rule 91 have been described as 
"the bedrock of Tax Court practice and [are] considered largely 
responsible for the courts' ability to keep current with the thousands of 
cases docketed each year." Farrell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
136 F.3d 889, 893 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
7. The additional taxes assessed for negligence and valuation 
overstatement are not taxes which the taxpayers owed but failed to pay. 
Rather, they are a penalty due in addition to any tax underpayment. 
Farrell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 136 F.3d at 892. 
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IV. 
 
A. 
 
The Commissioner had the burden of proving Merino's 
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence because the 
Commissioner first asserted the additions for negligence 
and valuation overstatement in an amended answer to the 
Merinos' petition for review. T. C. Rule 142(a); Vecchio v. 
Commissioner, 103 T. C. 170, 196 (1994); Achiro v. 
Commissioner, 77 T. C. 881, 890-91 (1981). At trial, the 
Commissioner introduced the expert reports of Steven 
Grossman and Richard S. Lindstrom. Grossman has a 
Ph.D. in Polymer Science and, at the time of the trial, was 
a Professor in Plastics Engineering at the University of 
Massachusetts. His report concluded that the Sentinel EPE 
recycler did not represent any technology that was new to 
the industry at the time of its offering. Moreover, his report 
concluded that comparable and more efficient technology to 
recycle polyethylene scrap was available elsewhere. For 
example, he testified that a machine called the"Foremost 
Densilator" provided equivalent capability, had been 
available since 1978, and that it sold for about $20,000 in 
1981. Grossman's report further concluded that the 
Sentinel EPE recycler was not viable from the start because 
it lacked new technology, a continuous source of suitable 
scrap, and an established market for the recycled pellets. 
Grossman believed that a reasonable investigation of the 
recycling industry in 1981 would have shown that the 
Sentinel EPE recycler had little, if any, commercial value. 
 
Richard Lindstrom, a consultant in plastics and plastics 
equipment at Arthur D. Little, Inc., from 1956 to 1989, 
concluded in his report that in 1981 commercial units were 
available that were equal to the Sentinel EPE recycler in 
function, product quality and capacity, and that they cost 
$50,000 or less. Consequently, Lindstrom opined that the 
value of the Sentinel EPE recycler did not exceed $50,000. 
 
Despite this evidence, Merino insisted that he had not 
negligently underpaid his tax because the record also 
demonstrated that he "undertook a high level of due 
diligence in investigating the bona fides of the investment." 
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Appellants' Br. at 21. This inquiry included, inter alia, 
spending several hours reviewing the Offering 
Memorandum, questioning the general partner about the 
recycler and its manufacturer, visiting the plant in 
Massachusetts, and investigating whether the EPE recycler 
was unique because it was capable of recycling low density 
polyethylene foam. Merino claimed that the evidence of this 
due diligence supports his contention that he believed that 
the recycler was a unique product employing novel 
technology when he first considered investing in Northeast 
in 1981, and that his investment and the resulting 
underpayment could not, therefore, have been negligent 
under the Tax Code. 
 
Merino also argued that, in addition to his due diligence 
inquiry, he performed an economic analysis of the 
investment in which he assumed that the price of oil was 
the critical factor. Merino's investment in Northeast was 
made in 1981, during the oil crisis. Merino argued that the 
conventional wisdom when he made his investment was 
that there was a reasonable expectation that crude oil 
prices would continue to rise significantly, and he 
maintained that the price of plastic is directly proportional 
to the price of crude oil. Therefore, in light of the expected 
rise in oil prices it would make economic sense for plastics 
manufacturers to purchase recycled resin pellets rather 
than new plastic resin, because plastic resin is a petroleum 
based product. Consequently, Merino asserted that, in 
1981, an investment in a plastic recycling operation was 
reasonable, and should not have invited any penalty based 
upon negligence or intentional overvaluation. 
 
Merino conceded that his economic analysis proved 
wrong. Even though the price of crude oil continued to rise 
in the latter part of 1981 and 1982, the price of low density 
polyethylene did not. In fact, it went down. However, 
Merino argued that he can not be found negligent under 
the Tax Code simply because a reasoned economic analysis 
of the future value of petroleum-based plastics turned out 
to be incorrect. Lastly, Merino argued that even though, in 
1981, the recycler had a manufacturing cost of $18,000, 
the fair market value of a Sentinel EPE recycler was 
$1,162,666, which was the amount F & G "paid" ECI for 
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each recycler. In arriving at that valuation, Merino did not 
value the recycler by itself. Instead, he asserted that 
manufacturing cost was not a consideration, and that the 
fair market value of the Sentinel EPE recycler could not be 
determined in isolation from the overall recycling system. 
When viewed in that context, he asserted, the recycler had 
a fair market value of $1,162,666. 
 
To support the argument that the Sentinel EPE recycler 
had a value higher than Lindstrom's estimate of $50,000, 
Merino submitted a report to the Tax Court that had been 
prepared by Ernest D. Carmagnola, the president of 
Professional Plastic Associates. Ironically, Carmagnola had 
originally been retained by the Commissioner in 1984 to 
evaluate Sentinel EPE recyclers. Based on his information 
then, Carmagnola estimated that the value of a Sentinel 
EPE recycler was $250,000. However, Carmagnola 
subsequently revised his report after receiving additional 
information. The additional information caused Carmagnola 
to state in a signed affidavit, dated March 16, 1993, that 
the fair market value in the recycler in the fall of 1981 was 
not more than $50,000. 
 
Despite his efforts to support the reasonableness of his 
valuation of the Sentinel EPE recycler, Merino conceded 
that he was aware of a number of other commercially 
available plastic recyclers that he knew ranged in price 
from $20,000 to $200,000 in 1981. Further, in apparent 
contradiction of his claim that the Sentinel EPE recycler's 
ability to recycle low density polyethylene foam made it 
unique, he stipulated that information published prior to 
his investment in Northeast indicated that there were 
several machines capable of recycling low density 
polyethylene foam that were already on the market in 1981. 
Merino testified that it was difficult to make money in the 
plastics recycling business, and Grossman refuted Merino's 
claim that the price of plastic is directly proportional to the 
price of crude oil. According to Grossman, a 300% increase 
in the price of crude oil results in only a 30% to 40% 
increase in the price of plastics products. 
 
After hearing the evidence, the Tax Court concluded that 
the Merinos "failed to exercise due care in claiming a large 
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deduction and tax credits with respect to Northeast.. . ." 
Tax Ct. Op. at 33-34. The court wrote: 
 
       In view of [Donald Merino's]8 educational background 
       and extensive experience in plastics and the nature 
       and extent of his investigation, he learned or should 
       have learned that the Sentinel EPE recycler was not 
       unique and not worth in excess of $50,000, and that 
       Northeast lacked economic substance and had no 
       potential for profit. [His] self-serving testimony to the 
       contrary is not credible, and this Court is not required 
       to accept it as true. In contrast, the reports of[the 
       Commissioner's] experts Lindstrom and Grossman, 
       which reach opposite conclusions from petitioner's, are 
       reasonable and persuasive, and the testimony of these 
       experts is supported by other portions of the record. 
 
Id. at 33. Consequently, it sustained the Commissioner's 
imposition of the negligence penalty. 
 
In support of its conclusions that Merino knew or should 
have known about the lack of profit potential, the Tax 
Court relied on the risk factors outlined in Northeast's 
prospectus, PI's high costs, Merino's knowledge of the 
difficulty of making money in plastics recycling, and the 
uncooperative attitude of PI employees during his 
inspection of PI's plant. The Tax Court based its conclusion 
that Merino knew, or should have known, that the recycler 
was not worth $1,162,666, on Merino's knowledge that 
equivalent recyclers were only worth $20,000 to $200,000, 
the lack of patent protection for the EPE recycler, and the 
resultant potential for competitors to appropriate any 
unique features the EPE recycler may have had. The court 
rejected Merino's claim that the recycler was worth 
$1,162,667 in the context of the overall system because 
that argument required the court to consider the sham 
transaction as though it were valid, and value the overall 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Rosemarie Merino is a party to these proceedings because the Merinos 
filed joint returns for the years in question. Apparently, however, she 
had little, if anything, to do with the decision to invest in Northeast. 
Consequently, the Tax Court negligence analysis focused exclusively on 
Donald Merino. However, since the Merinos filed a joint return we refer 
to the "taxpayers" here. 
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system accordingly. The court discounted Merino's reliance 
on the oil crises because it believed the Commissioner's 
contrary evidence that the price of plastics is not directly 
proportional to the price of oil. The court gave no weight to 
the Carmagnola valuation report because it was based 
upon incomplete information and had subsequently been 
repudiated by Carmagnola. Finally, the Tax Court noted 
that the taxpayers' claimed tax benefits equaled 170% of 
their cash investment and therefore, except for a few weeks 
at the very beginning, they never had any money in the 
transaction and invested solely as a tax avoidance measure. 
 
B. 
 
IRC SS 6653(a), and 6653(a)(1), provide for an addition to 
tax equal to 5% of any underpayment of tax if any part of 
the underpayment is due to negligence or intentional 
disregard of rules and regulations.9 Beginning with tax year 
1981, IRC S 6653(a) further provided for an addition to tax 
equal to 50% of the interest payable on that portion of the 
underpayment which is attributable to negligence or 
intentional disregard of rules and regulations. 10 The 
Commissioner assessed negligence penalties including 
interest that Merino purportedly owed for the tax years in 
question. Merino's counsel has informed this court that, as 
of the time this appeal was argued, the total amount of the 
negligence penalty, including interest, had grown to more 
than $400,000. 
 
IRC S 6653 defines "negligence" as follows: "negligence 
includes any failure to reasonably comply with the Tax 
Code, including the lack of due care or the failure to do 
what a reasonable or ordinarily prudent person would do 
under the circumstances." Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 
F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990). The inquiry into a taxpayer's 
negligence is highly individualized, and turns on all of the 
surrounding circumstances including the taxpayer's 
education, intellect, and sophistication. See David v. 
Commissioner, 43 F.3d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 1995). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. S 6653(a)(1) provides for this penalty beginning in tax year 1981. 
 
10. See n.1 supra. 
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We review the Tax Court's conclusion that Merino 
negligently claimed the credits and losses to determine if it 
is "clearly erroneous". Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 
40-2, 406 (2d Cir. 1994). A finding is clearly erroneous 
"when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 
U. S. 364, 395 (1948). If the Tax Court 
 
       account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 
       record viewed in its entirety, [we] may not reverse it 
       even though convinced that had [we] been sitting as a 
       trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence 
       differently. Where there are two permissible views of 
       the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them 
       cannot be clearly erroneous. 
 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 575 
(1985)(citation omitted). 
 
We can not conclude on this record that the Tax Court's 
decision was clearly erroneous. Donald Merino admitted 
that, as a result of his experience in the plastics industry, 
he knew that it was difficult to make money in the plastics 
recycling business, and testified that he knew equivalent 
recyclers were available in the marketplace with market 
values between $20,000 and $200,000. Moreover, he was 
unable to precisely demonstrate how he arrived at his 
conclusion that the Sentinel EPE recycler - which had a 
manufacturing cost of $18,000 - had a tax basis of 
$1,162,666, other than his unconvincing explanation that 
it had to be valued as part of the overall recycling system. 
The Tax Court properly rejected that explanation. It would 
strain credulity, given all of the testimony before the Tax 
Court, to hold that Merino was not negligent in 
underpaying his taxes. Accordingly, we hold that the Tax 
Court correctly sustained the imposition of the negligence 
penalty. 
 
C. 
 
IRC S 6659(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f an 
individual . . . has an underpayment of the [income] tax . . . 
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which is attributable to a valuation overstatement, then 
there shall be added to the tax" a graduated penalty.11 IRC 
S 6659(c) defined a "valuation overstatement" as occurring 
whenever "the value of any property, or the adjusted basis 
of any property, claimed on any return" is overstated by 
150 percent or more. The valuation overstatement penalty 
applies only to the tax year 1981 because that was the year 
in which the overstatement was made. Here, the claimed 
valuation exceeded 250 percent of the actual value. 
Accordingly, the additional tax is 30% of the 
underpayment. IRC S 6659(b). The Commissioner has 
calculated the valuation overstatement penalty to be 
$6,645. 
 
An inquiry into an overstatement penalty must focus 
upon whether the underpayment is attributable to the 
overvaluation. A majority of the Courts of Appeals that have 
addressed this issue have held that "when an 
underpayment stems from deductions that are disallowed 
due to a lack of economic substance, the deficiency is 
attributable to an overstatement of value and is subject to 
the penalty of S 6659." Zfass v. Commissioner, 118 F.3d 
184, 190 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Illes v. Commissioner, 982 
F.2d 163, 167 (6th Cir. 1992); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 
F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1991); Massengill v. Commissioner, 
876 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1989)). Under this view, 
whenever a taxpayer knowingly invests in a tax avoidance 
entity which the taxpayer should know has no economic 
substance, the valuation overstatement penalty is applied 
as a matter of course. 
 
Here, the Tax Court found that Northeast was a sham in 
that it had no economic substance, and no potential for 
profit. Tax Ct. Op. at 20; 33. It also found that the Sentinel 
EPE recycler was not worth more than $50,000. Id. at 33. 
Furthermore, the Merinos stipulated that the actual basis 
for a Sentinel EPE recycler in 1981 was not more than 
$50,000. The Merinos also agreed not to contest the 
existence of a valuation overstatement on their return. 
Under these circumstances, the Tax Court correctly 
concluded that the underpayment on the 1981 return was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See n. 1 supra. 
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"attributable to" a valuation overstatement. 12 Tax Ct. Op. at 
35. 
 
The Merinos argue that where, as here, the 
Commissioner completely disallows a claimed tax benefit, 
the tax underpayment cannot be attributable to a valuation 
overstatement. They base that argument on two cases 
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, viz., 
Todd v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988), and 
Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990). 
Todd v. Commissioner, involved husband and wife taxpayers 
who invested in FoodSource, Inc., which sold interests in 
refrigerated food containers to investors. The containers 
were designed to preserve perishable agricultural products 
during shipment to foreign and domestic markets. Each 
investor paid a fraction of the alleged purchase price of part 
or all of a refrigerated unit and signed a promissory note for 
the balance. FoodSource managed the containers, rented 
them to food transporters, and regularly reported"profits" 
each investor purportedly earned. 
 
The Todds purchased two containers on December 8, 
1981 and a third on October 14, 1982. They paid 
FoodSource $52,000 for each container, and signed 
promissory notes that raised the price of each container to 
$260,000. The Todds then used the $260,000 figure as the 
basis of each refrigerated unit, claimed investment tax 
credits and depreciation deductions for the 1981 and 1982 
tax years, and carried unused portions of the investment 
tax credits back to 1979 and 1980. However, FoodSource 
did not place the Todds' containers into service until 1983 
because of a payment dispute. 
 
The IRS assessed deficiencies and penalties against the 
Todds and a host of other FoodSource investors who 
participated in a test case before the Tax Court. In that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Tax Court finding that a tax underpayment is attributable to a 
valuation overstatement is also subject to the clearly erroneous standard 
of review. Wolf v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1993). 
However, the question of whether the valuation overstatement statute 
applies to a particular taxpayer's situation is a question of law that we 
subject to plenary review. See Gainer v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 225, 
226 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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case, Noonan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-449, 52 
T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (1986), the Tax Court held that the Todds 
were not entitled to their claimed deductions and credits for 
1979 to 1982 because their containers had not been placed 
in service until 1983. However, other investors like the 
Hillendahls and the Hendricks, had their containers placed 
in service during the years for which they claimed tax 
benefits. The Tax Court nevertheless also ruled against 
them because the obligations represented by the 
promissory notes those investors signed were illusory. 
Accordingly, the Tax Court limited the adjusted basis each 
taxpayer could claim to the lesser of the $60,000 fair 
market value of the container or the actual cash payment 
made by the taxpayer for the unit. Accordingly, investors 
like the Hillendahls and the Hendricks received 
substantially smaller deductions and credits than they 
claimed because of their reduced basis in the refrigerated 
units. They were also found liable for an addition to tax for 
a valuation overstatement pursuant to IRC S 6659, and the 
Tax Court remanded the matter so that the Commissioner 
could calculate the amount of the deficiencies. 
 
On remand, the Commissioner assessed the IRC S 6659 
valuation overstatement penalty against the Todds, who 
timely petitioned the Tax Court and challenged the penalty. 
The Tax Court held that since the Todds' claimed benefits 
were disallowed because the refrigerated units were not 
placed in service during the tax years in question, their 
underpayment of tax was not attributable to the valuation 
overstatement contained in their returns. Thus, the Tax 
Court overruled the Commissioner's imposition of the 
overvaluation penalty. Not unexpectedly, the Commissioner 
appealed. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the language of IRC S 6659 was ambiguous, and proceeded 
to examine legislative history. It stated: 
 
       Congress initially enacted S 6659 as part of the 
       Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The House Ways 
       and Means Committee recognized the large number of 
       property valuation disputes clogging the tax collection 
       system, and added the overvaluation penalty to 
       discourage those taxpayers who would inflate the value 
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       of property on their tax returns in hopes of "dividing 
       the difference" with the IRS. Unfortunately, none of the 
       formal legislative history provides a method for 
       calculating whether a given tax underpayment is 
       attributable to a valuation overstatement. 
 
862 F.2d at 542. However, the court applied a formula 
found in the General Explanation of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act, a book prepared by the staff on the Joint 
Committee on Taxation. Id. Under that formula: 
 
       The portion of a tax underpayment that is attributable 
       to a valuation overstatement will be determined after 
       taking into account any other proper adjustments to 
       tax liability. Thus, the underpayment resulting from a 
       valuation overstatement will be determined by 
       comparing the taxpayer's (1) actual tax liability (i.e., 
       the tax liability that results from a proper valuation 
       and which takes into account any other proper 
       adjustments) with (2) actual tax liability as reduced by 
       taking into account the valuation overstatement. The 
       difference between these two amounts will be the 
       underpayment that is attributable to the valuation 
       overstatement. 
 
Id. at 542-43. The court offered the following illustration of 
how the formula would work: 
 
       The determination of the portion of a tax 
       underpayment that is attributable to a valuation 
       overstatement may be illustrated by the following 
       example. Assume that in 1982 an individual files a 
       joint return showing taxable income of $40,000 and 
       tax liability of $9,195. Assume, further, that a $30,000 
       deduction which was claimed by the taxpayer as the 
       result of a valuation overstatement is adjusted down to 
       $10,000, and that another deduction of $20,000 is 
       disallowed totally for reasons apart from the valuation 
       overstatement. These adjustments result in correct 
       taxable income of $80,000 and correct tax liability of 
       $27,505. Accordingly, the underpayment due to the 
       valuation overstatement is the difference between the 
       tax on $80,000 ($27,505) and the tax on $60,000 
       ($17,505) (i.e., actual tax liability reduced by taking 
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       into account the deductions disallowed because of the 
       valuation overstatement), or $9,800 [sic]. 
 
Id. at 543. 
 
Applying the formula to the Todds' situation, the Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Tax Court had properly held that the 
Todds were not liable for the overvaluation penalty because 
"no portion of the Todds' tax underpayment was 
attributable to their valuation overstatements." Id. Under 
the formula, the 
 
       Todds' actual tax liability, after adjusting for the failure 
       to place the food containers in service before 1983, did 
       not differ from their actual tax liability adjusted for the 
       valuation overstatements. In other words, where the 
       deductions and credits for these refrigeration units were 
       inappropriate altogether, the Todds' valuation of the 
       property supposedly generating the tax benefits had no 
       impact whatsoever on the amount of tax actually owed. 
 
Id. at 543 (emphasis added). Consequently, the Todds were 
not liable for the valuation overstatement penalty. 
 
The Merinos argue that the Todd rationale should govern 
the adjudication of their case. The Commissioner did not 
reduce the basis of the Sentinel EPE recycler from 
$1,162,666 to $50,000 and then adjust their tax liability for 
the valuation overstatement. Instead, the Commissioner 
disallowed the claimed tax benefit entirely. As a result of 
the complete disallowance, the Merinos argue that the 
overvaluation of the recycler had no effect on the amount of 
the tax they owed. In other words, the Merinos argue that 
the Joint Committee on Taxation's formula cannot be 
applied here because there is no difference between the 
actual tax liability resulting from the disallowance and the 
actual tax liability as reduced by taking into account the 
valuation overstatement. The Merinos argue that the 
Commissioner effectively reduced their basis in the recycler 
to zero and made the formula unworkable by completely 
disallowing the claimed benefit. 
 
However, there are significant differences between the 
Todds and the Merinos. First, even though FoodSource was 
a tax shelter, it was not lacking in economic substance. See 
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Noonan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1986-449 ("In this 
case, as contrasted to many of the so-called `tax shelter' 
cases in which we have determined that investors did not 
have an actual and honest profit objective, the subject 
property [i.e., the refrigerated unit] was actually produced 
and the plan of operation had some commercial potential."). 
In contrast, the Northeast plastics recycling shelter was a 
pure, unadulterated, tax avoidance scheme totally devoid of 
economic substance. Second, the deduction in Todd was 
disallowed because the refrigerated unit was not placed in 
service during the taxable years in which the taxpayers 
claimed the deduction. The claimed benefit was not 
disallowed because the Todds overvalued the property. 
Thus, the Todds' overvaluation had nothing to do with the 
Commissioner's disallowance. The tax benefit claimed by 
the Merinos was disallowed because the valuation 
overstatement was an integral part of a tax avoidance 
scheme. There was no other reason for the disallowance. 
See Zfass v. Commissioner, 118 F.3d at 190-191 (rejecting 
taxpayer's Todd-inspired argument where the claimed 
benefit was disallowed solely because the asset was 
overvalued and part of a tax scheme). 
 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has extended Todd to a case where an overvaluation of an 
asset resulted solely from a taxpayer's interest in a tax 
avoidance scheme. In Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.3d 
380 (5th Cir. 1990), the court wrote: 
 
       We see no reason to treat this case any differently than 
       Todd. Whenever the I.R.S. totally disallows a deduction 
       or credit, the I.R.S. may not penalize the taxpayer for 
       a valuation overstatement included in that deduction 
       or credit. In such a case, the underpayment is not 
       attributable to a valuation overstatement. Instead, it is 
       attributable to claiming an improper deduction or 
       credit. 
 
Id. at 383. Consequently, the court found that the "IRS 
erred when it assessed the valuation overstatement penalty 
and the Tax Court erred as a matter of law by upholding 
that assessment." Id. In Heasley, unlike Todd, there were 
no grounds for the disallowance of the claimed benefit other 
than the overvaluation. 
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However, we do not find the Heasley rationale persuasive 
here because the court's decision appears to have been 
driven by understandable sympathy for the Heasleys rather 
than by a technical analysis of the statute. We do not 
disagree with the analysis there, however, it has no 
application here. Mr. and Mrs. Heasley were blue-collar 
workers who had not graduated from high school. 13 The 
Heasleys had four children, were concerned about their 
children's futures, and were aware that they were not 
knowledgeable enough to invest on their own. 
Consequently, they relied completely on the advice of an 
investment advisor who led them into the challenged tax 
avoidance scheme. Id. at 381. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the Heasleys should not be subjected to the 
additional interest penalty for a tax-motivated transaction 
because they had a good faith expectation of profit, even 
though the court accepted the Tax Court's findings that the 
entity in which the Heasleys invested lacked economic 
substance and generated only tax deductions and credits 
and not income. Id. at 385-86. Thus, as the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subsequently observed, "the 
Heasleys were indeed scammed out of a considerable sum 
of money." Zfass, 118 F.3d at 190 n.8. However, the 
Merinos are not the Heasleys. 
 
We do not believe that Todd and Heasley provide an 
analytical umbrella for the Merinos because of the 
significant differences between the Merinos and the 
Heasleys. Moreover, we do not believe that the complete 
disallowance of the claimed benefit here precludes the 
imposition of the valuation overstatement penalty for the 
simple reason that, given the facts that were either 
stipulated to or established before the Tax Court, the 
overvaluation of the property in question here is an 
essential component of the tax avoidance scheme. 
 
       Where a transaction is not recognized because it lacks 
       economic substance, the resulting underpayment is 
       attributable to the implicit overvaluation. A transaction 
       that lacks economic substance generally reflects an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Mrs. Heasley did, however, have a GED and she had earned 18 
college credits. 
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       arrangement in which the basis of the property was 
       misvalued in the context of the transaction. While this 
       interpretation of underpayment "attributable to a 
       valuation overstatement" represents a less common 
       application of section 6659, we believe it comprehends 
       the tax return representations that Congress intended 
       to penalize. 
 
Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 1991). 
Consequently, where a claimed tax benefit is disallowed 
because it is an integral part of a transaction lacking 
economic substance, the imposition of the valuation 
overstatement penalty is properly imposed, absent 
considerations that are not present here. 
 
D. 
 
IRC S 6659(e) permits the Commissioner to waive the 
valuation overstatement penalty "on a showing by the 
taxpayer that there was a reasonable basis for the valuation 
or adjusted basis claimed on the return and that such 
claim was made in good faith." The Commissioner's refusal 
to waive a S 6659 addition to tax is reviewable for abuse of 
discretion. Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132, 179 
(1992). 
 
The Merinos do not argue that there was an abuse of 
discretion by the Commissioner in failing to waive the 
penalty. Indeed, they cannot make that argument because 
they never requested a waiver from the Commissioner. They 
can not now argue that the Commissioner abused his 
discretion by refusing a request they never made. See 
McCoy Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 557, 563 
(10th Cir. 1995)("It is a well established principle of 
administrative law that where a party fails to present a 
claim to the proper administrative agency, courts will 
decline to consider that party's claim."). Instead, they make 
the rather novel argument that the Tax Court erred by not 
requiring the Commissioner to waive the valuation 
overstatement penalty. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Merinos do not provide any 
authority for the proposition that the Tax Court can order 
the Commissioner to affirmatively do something that is 
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within the original discretion of the Commissioner where 
there is absolutely no record evidence of an abuse of 
administrative discretion. We believe that it is the taxpayers 
and their counsel who ought to request any such waiver, 
not the Tax Court. 
 
V. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the decision of 
the Tax Court. In doing so, however, we note that we are 
not completely unsympathetic to the Merinos' plight. The 
Merinos' calculation of their tax liability for the years in 
question deprived the Commissioner of approximately 
$50,000 in taxes. The operation of IRC SS 6653 and 6659 
have now resulted in a liability that is approaching one-half 
of one million dollars. Although the taxpayers did not 
request a waiver of the penalty for overstatement under IRC 
SS 6659(e), we would hope that the Commissioner would 
still seriously entertain such a request if the taxpayers 
make it at this late date. We assume that, if such a request 
is made the Commissioner will afford it whatever 
consideration would have been appropriate had it been 
made in a timely manner.14 
 
As we noted earlier, the Merinos are not the Heasleys. 
Nevertheless, we can not help but express our concern over 
the proportionality of the Commissioner's actions here. 
Nevertheless, the decision of the Tax Court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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14. Of course, we take no position as to whether the Commisioner's 
denial of any such request would be viewed as an abuse of discretion. 
That is not before us. 
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